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NOTE
LEGISLATION BY IMPLICATION: THE EXERCISE
OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY UNDER THE 1978
AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 504 OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
INTRODUCTION
The federal government has a long history of providing
financial aid to state agencies for the purpose of assisting hand-
icapped persons.' Both federal and state funds have been com-
mitted to allow millions of Americans to participate in job
training and educational benefits, with helping handicapped
persons attain financial independence as the goal. To no small
degree the programs have been successful.
2
In 1973, Congress reenacted an appropriations measure for
the joint state and federal rehabilitation programs. The bill
included a new provision-§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which provided:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States as defined in [the Act] shall solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 3
This prohibition of discrimination and an affirmative action
requirement in § 5031 were contained in a "miscellaneous" title
I The joint federal and state assistance program began in 1920. H.R. REP. No. 95-
1149, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 3, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7470.
The 1970 Census reported that 12,091,000 persons between the ages of 18 and 64
were partially or totally work disabled. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, Census of Popula-
tion: 1975, Subject Reports, Final Report PC(2)-6C, Persons with Work Disability
Tables 1, 4, reprinted in 41 Fed. Reg. 20,368 (1976).
2 The House Education and Labor Committee reported that over four million
people have been rehabilitated since the beginning of the service; 291,202 in fiscal year
1977. H.R. REP. No. 95-1149, supra note 1, at 3.
1 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (1973) (cur-
rent version at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1979)).
1 Id. § 503 (1973) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. 1975)). This section
requires that in any contract for procurement of personal property or nonpersonal
services in excess of $2500, the contractor must take affirmative action to "employ and
advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals . . ." to carry out the
contract.
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of the bill. The language of § 504 was virtually identical to that
of § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color or national origin.'
For a number of reasons, the Rehabilitation Act has left
courts and administrative agencies to fill the gap created by
the statutory language. In 1978, Congress acted to clarify its
intent and close that gap.' The 1978 amendments arguably fail
to clarify two significant issues of statutory construction arising
from § 504: (1) whether handicapped persons may pursue indi-
vidual remedies through a private right of action; and (2)
whether the statutory definition of "otherwise qualified handi-
capped individual" promotes consistent and responsible en-
forcement of the Act.
Litigation involving these issues has occurred primarily
because of the vagueness of the statutory language and second-
arily because of the varying interpretations of § 504 by the
courts and federal agencies. This note discusses the gap created
by § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the dilemma it presents,
and whether the 1978 amendments are a sufficient bridge. Be-
ginning with an analysis of the legislative and administrative
bases of § 504, judicial construction of the statute will be con-
sidered. Finally, both the practical and ideal solutions to each
issue will be discussed, concluding with recommendations for
legislative change.
I. ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 504 THROUGH A PRIVATE RIGHT OF
ACTION
Congress enacted § 504 and the other portions of Title V
of the Rehabilitation Act with very little discussion; the direc-
tive to federal agencies regarding the exercise of their spending
authority might appropriately be termed a "sense of Congress"
resolution.7 However, because the Act created certain expecta-
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides that "[n]o person in the United States ... shall, on the grounds of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance."
I Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 119, 92 Stat. 2982 (1978).
7 Only a cursory comment was made in the Senate Labor and Public Welfare
Committee's report: "[The bill further includes a provision proclaiming a policy of
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tions on the part of affected groups, it was necessary to develop
a means of enforcement. The omission of an express remedial
section encouraged courts to grant aggrieved individuals an
implied right of action to enforce the statute's political man-
date."
A. Significance of an Implied Cause of Action
Implication of a private cause of action has particular re-
levance to private agencies which accept federal financial assis-
tance. Through their utilization of federal funds, private recipi-
ents become subject to the constraints imposed by § 504 as well
as by one or more additional civil rights statutes? In the ab-
sence of an implied right of action under § 504, aggrieved indi-
viduals may be unable to sue private discriminators.
Although public entities and private persons acting under
color of state law may be sued for violations of civil rights
under either the Federal Constitution or 42 U.S.C. 88 198310
and 1985, certain elements must be present. Obviously, a con-
stitutional suit must be based upon some alleged violation of
a constitutionally guaranteed right. In a suit under § 1983, a
violation of federally protected rights must be alleged. The
non-discrimination against otherwise qualified handicapped individuals with respect
to participation in or access to any program which is in receipt of federal financial
assistance." S. REP. No. 93-318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 50, reprinted in [1973] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2026, 2123.
1 For additional discussion on this issue, see DuBow, Litigating for the Rights of
Handicapped People, 27 DE PAUL L. Rav. 1101 (1978); Ewing, Health Planning and
Deinstitutionalization: Advocacy Within the Administrative Process, 31 STAN. L. RaV.
679, 706-09 (1979); Seng, Private Rights of Action, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 117 (1978); Note,
Enforcing § 504 Regulations: The Need for a Private Cause of Action to Remedy
Discrimination Against the Handicapped, 27 CAm. U. L. Rav. 345 (1978); Comment,
Toward Equal Rights for Handicapped Individuals: Judicial Enforcement of Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 676 (1977).
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 252 (1964) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Supp. 1973)); Community Development Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 118, 88 Stat. 653 (1974) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1701u
(Supp. 1979)); Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318,86 Stat. 373 (1972)
(current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 1979)).
10 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) declares that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects . . . any citizen . . . or other
person. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
1979-80]
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plaintiff must, therefore, first establish state "involvement""1
in the alleged violation of individual rights and then establish
some right to the claimed benefit. The mere receipt of federal
funds or tax exemptions as showing state involvement has re-
peatedly been rejected as insufficient to support a § 1983 claim
when no other direct state involvement could be established.12
Most importantly, discrimination by a private party is permis-
sible if there is an insufficient showing of "state action" or
conduct under "color of state law."1 3
B. The Standard for Implication of a Private Right of Action
1. Historical Development
A private right of suit under a federal regulatory statute
was first implied by the United States Supreme Court in Texas
& Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby. 4 In Rigsby, a railway em-
ployee sought damages for injuries caused by the railroad's
violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act. The Court per-
mitted him to recover for injuries sustained in the course of
employment, commenting that its first inquiry must be
whether the plaintiff was one of the class for whose "especial
benefit the statute was enacted": "[D]isregard of the com-
mand of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in
damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party
in default is implied." 5
In the fifty years since Rigsby, courts have been reluctant
to imply a private right to sue; in fact, most instances have
" Action under color of state law is coextensive with the "state action" doctrine
of the fourteenth amendment. Adickes v. S.S. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
12 See Schlein v. Milford Hospital, Inc., 561 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1977); Jackson v.
American Bar Ass'n, 538 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1976); Berrios v. Inter-American Univ., 535
F.2d 1330 (1st Cir. 1976); Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975);
Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. den., 425 U.S. 943 (1975).
Contra, Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977); Simkins v.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 328 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. den., 376 U.S. 938
(1964).
"3 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
" 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
,5 Id. at 39. The Rigsby decision, while it served to establish guidelines for implica-
tion of a private right to sue, was in fact jurisdictionally based on removal by the
federal corporation defendant. The heart of the case was what the proper standard of
care for the federal defendant should be under the pre-Erie rule then in effect.
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involved the Railway Labor Act of 1926.16 The decision of the
Court to imply a private right of action under that Act was
buttressed by congressional approval of the Court's decision in
the 1934 amendments.'7 Subsequently, the Court extended to
private persons the power to enforce the Act's requirement that
a labor organization, acting as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative, has a duty to represent all employees regardless of
their race.'8 In other contexts, the Supreme Court rejected the
claims of many individuals who sought to privately enforce
rights created by federal statutes.19 Those decisions indicated
that where Congress created some other means for enforcing
the duty created by statute, the Court would refuse to imply a
private right of action.
It was not until 1964, in J.I Case Co. v. Borak,20 that the
Court permitted a private right of suit to be implied under a
federal statute which included an express administrative en-
forcement procedure."' Nevertheless, since the Borak decision,
the Court has permitted an implied right of action only in these
extremely limited circumstances: (1) under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
and 1982, which were enacted expressly to permit private en-
forcement of constitutional rights;" (2) under § 5 of the Voting
, 42 U.S.C. § 151 (1970); see Texas & N.O. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548
(1930).
," Railway Labor Act Amendments of 1934, Pub. L. No. 441-690, § 151, 48 Stat.
1185 (amending 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1926)).
11 Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210
(1944); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Virginian Ry.
Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
1" See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963); T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United
States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959); General Committee v. M.-K.-T. R. Co., 320 U.S. 323
(1943); Switchmen's Union of North America v. Nat'l Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297
(1943).
2 377 U.S. 426.
21 In Borak, a private cause of action was implied under § 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits proxy solicitation in contravention of SEC
regulations.
22 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968). See also Griffin v. Breckinridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), in which the Court permit-
ted a private action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) but cautioned: "The constitutional
shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law
can be avoided by giving full effect to the congressional purpose-by requiring, as an
element of the cause of action . . . [an] invidiously discriminatory motivation . .. ."
Id. at 102. The Court also based its opinion on the thirteenth amendment and the
fundamental constitutional right to travel. Id. at 105-06.
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Rights Act of 1965, which might be explained by the Court's
concern for protecting the electoral process;" and (3) under rule
10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission rules which
prohibit fraud upon purchasers and sellers of securities.24 In a
number of recent cases in which the issue was presented, the
Court similarly refused to imply a private right of action.
Many courts' reason for permitting private enforcement is
that when individual rights are created by a statute, a remedy
should be available - "ubi jus ibi remedium.' '21 Particularly
where the right seems to be an individual right, rather than
that of the government or an undefined group, the courts are
willing to imply the missing statutory language.
2. The Cort v. Ash Standard
In Cort v. Ash, 2 the Court established a four-part test for
implying a private cause of action. The standard combined the
single element enunciated in Rigsby with considerations based
on congressional intent:
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial bene-
fit the statute was enacted ... that is, does the statute cre-
ate a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there
any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either
to create such a right or to deny one? Third, is it consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to
imply such a right for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause
of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
2 Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
See also, Seng, Private Rights of Action, 27 DE PAUL L. Rlv. 1117 (1978); Note,
Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REV. 285(1963); Note, Emerging Standards for Implied Actions under Federal Statutes, 9 U.
MicH. J.L. REF. 294 (1976); Note, Implication of Private Actions from Federal Stat-
utes: From Borak to Ash, 1 J. CORP. L. 371 (1975-76); Comment, Private Right of
Action under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1392 (1975).
25 See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S.Ct. 2479 (1979); Chrysler Corp.
v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978);
Piper v. Chris Craft Ind., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v.
National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S.
134 (1964).
21 For every right there is a remedy. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.
at 39, 40.
- 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inap-
propriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law?"
Even though the Supreme Court refused to imply a private
cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 610-the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 19719 -the test established in Cort has be-
come the primary means of deciding whether Congress in-
tended to permit a private right to sue in the absence of express
statutory language.
C. Section 504 Case Law Prior to the 1978 Amendments
Even though the Rehabilitation Act received congres-
sional approval and was amended in 1973 and 1974, respec-
tively, the administrative responsibility for enforcement of the
Act was not assigned until 1976, when President Gerald Ford
issued Executive Order 11914.1° He directed that the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) coordinate reg-
ulatory activity for the Act. Impatience with this executive
delay in enforcing the Act led to litigation by handicap activ-
ists to force compliance with the law."
1. Decisions of Courts of Appeals
The first case to reach a federal court of appeals under the
Act was Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority,3" in which
a class of mobility impaired handicapped persons sought to
enjoin a municipal transportation system in northern Illinois
from purchasing vehicles inaccessible to them. They sought
z' Id. at 78.
The Court decided that the Federal Election Campaign Act was essentially a
criminal statute not intended to be civilly enforced. Id. at 79,80.
10 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976).
31 Even though HEW maintained that regulations were unnecessary because the
statutory proscription was clear, a district judge ordered HEW to issue final regula-
tions for § 504 in Cherry v. Matthews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976). The court's
decision was consistent with the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee Report
which urged the prompt delegation of enforcement to HEW and indicated its under-
standing that regulations would be forthcoming within the year. SENATE CoMMrrrEE
ON LABOR & PUBLC WELFARE, REPORT ON THE REHABILITATION ACT AMENDMENT OF 1974,
S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6373, 6391 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1297].
548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
1979-80]
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relief under the Rehabilitation Act as well as the Urban Mass
Transportation Act of 1964,11 the Architectural Barriers Act of
1968,11 and the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment.3 5
The district court had dismissed the action for failure to
state a claim for relief. The Seventh Circuit, reversing the lower
court, held that the Rehabilitation Act affirmatively requires
recipients of federal financial assistance to make programs and
facilities accessible to mobility impaired persons." The court
based this decision on the Supreme Court's opinion in a Title
VI action brought by Chinese-American parents against the
San Francisco school district. In Lau v. Nichols,3 1 the Court
held that the failure of the school system to provide Chinese
language programs or special English training effectively de-
nied to the children the benefit from a federally assisted pro-
gram in violation of Title VI' 5 Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, stated: "[W]e do not reach the Equal Protection
Clause argument but rely solely on § 601 of the Civil Rights Act
.... "'9 Because the Rehabilitation Act was based on the Civil
Rights Act, the Lloyd court reasoned that it, too, created an
affirmative duty.
The court then proceeded to examine the Act to decide
whether a private right of action should be available to enforce
that duty. It applied the test set out in Cort v. Ash4 and con-
cluded that it was satisfied.' First, the Act was clearly in-
tended to benefit handicapped persons. Second, the legislative
history of the Act indicated to the court that Congress had no
intention of denying a private right of action, and may well
have intended to create such a right.12 The court quoted the
49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 4151 (1970).
1 "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
548 F.2d at 1284.
414 U.S. 563 (1974).
' Lau is authority for the proposition that a private right of action may be more
easily found for the enforcement of federally created civil rights.
11 414 U.S. at 566.
40 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra for an exposi-
tion of Cort.
11 548 F.2d at 1285.
42 Id.
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1974 Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee Report in
support of its conclusion that Congress intended to permit a
private right of action:
This approach to implementation of section 504, which
closely follows the models of [title VI and title IX] would
insure administrative due process. . . , provide for adminis-
trative consistency within the Federal government, as well as
relative ease of implementation, and permit a judicial rem-
edy through a private action."
Even though the court commented that this legislative state-
ment indicated an intent to permit judicial review of an admin-
istrative proceeding, the court of appeals decided that the third
Cort test was satisfied, adding that it would not be inconsistent
with the legislative scheme to permit a private right of action."
The fact that there was, at the time of the decision, no adminis-
trative mechanism for the enforcement of these rights per-
suaded the court to permit a private action.45 The court also
found, in satisfaction of the fourth prong of the test, that feder-
ally created individual rights were traditionally protected by
the courts and therefore were not a subject of exclusive state
concern.46
Three federal circuits followed the lead of the Seventh
Circuit, often without examining the limitations expressed by
that court. United Handicapped Federation v. Andre"' and
Leary v. Crapsey" were decisions of the Eighth and Second
Circuits, respectively, in which the courts permitted mobility
impaired handicapped persons to proceed against public
transit systems. In both instances the courts of appeals re-
manded the actions to the district court for a determination of
whether the defendants were operating in compliance with the
urban mass transit regulations.
In actions not involving public transit, the courts have
heard other suits under § 504 which attacked discrimination
against handicapped persons. For example, actions challenging
Id. at 1285-86.
" Id. at 1286.
Id.
Id.
558 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1977).
566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977).
1979-801
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(1) the denial of the opportunity to participate in school ath-
letic programs;49 (2) the refusal to include full psychiatric care
in a state health care program;" (3) the refusal to permit a
blind applicant for a teaching position to take a qualifying
test;5' and (4) the denial of admission to a deaf nursing school
applicant, 5- reached the federal circuit courts prior to the effec-
tive date of the 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act.
These cases involved public entity defendants and were
based both on § 504 and the Equal Protection Clause. In most
instances the courts either summarily allowed a private action
or, because they decided the case on the merits of the equal
protection claim, found it unnecessary to decide the private
right of action issue.
In Kampmeier v. Nyquist,5 3 the Second Circuit found
that a private right of action exists under § 504. The court
heard the appeal of parents of junior high school students
who had been denied the right to participate in school contact
athletics because of partial blindness. The court rejected the
appeal based upon the fact that the school system had pre-
sented a substantial justification for its decision-the school
district's interest in the health of its children. 4
Doe v. Colautti,55 an appeal which challenged a hospital
policy limiting hospital stay for psychiatric, but not for physi-
cal, illness, did not disturb the lower court's opinion 5 that a
private right of action is available under the Rehabilitation
Act. The Third Circuit decided that the state would not be
required to pay for more than sixty days of hospitalization for
psychiatric treatment because persons with mental illnesses
were not denied equal treatment for their physical illnesses.
They were therefore not discriminated against under § 504 or
denied equal treatment under the Constitution.
11 Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977).
Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979).
, Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
52 Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd,
99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979). See text accompanying notes 184-205 infra for a discussion of
the Supreme Court's opinion.
- 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1977).
I ld.
592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979).
454 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
17 592 F.2d at 708, 709.
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However, the Third Circuit faced the implication issue
squarely in NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.5" Even
though the district court had refused to consider Title VI pre-
cedents because the defendant was not acting under color of
state law,5" the court reversed and remanded the decision for
reconsideration of the merits of the § 504 claim. Relying heavily
on the recent Supreme Court opinion in Cannon v. University
of Chicago,"° the court decided that the legislative history of
Title VI permitted a private right of action. Accordingly, it
held that because § 504 was virtually identical to Title VI,
Congress also intended to permit a private right to sue under
§ 504.1
2. District Court Approaches
The district courts, following the four circuit courts, have
found a private right of action against both public62 and private
entities.63 However, they also have applied principles of admin-
S 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979).
. 453 F. Supp 280 (D. Del. 1978). The district court found that the legislative
history of § 504 contemplated judicial review of administrative determinations rather
than an original suit in federal court. A private right of enforcement was held to be
inconsistent with the administrative remedy and improper under the analyses of Lloyd
v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977), and Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1977). Of course, Cannon was subsequently reversed
by the Supreme Court. 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979).
10 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979).
6, This is precisely the approach suggested by § 505 of the 1978 amendments to
the Rehabilitation Act. However, the amendments were not mentioned by the court.
62 Courts have permitted private actions under § 504 against transportation sys-
tems, Atlantis Comm. Inc. v. Adams, 453 F. Supp. 825 (D. Colo. 1978); Michigan
Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Coleman, 451 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Vanko
v. Finley, 440 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Philadelphia Council of Neighborhood
Orgs. v. Coleman, 437 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Bartels v. Beirnat, 427 F. Supp.
226 (E.D. Wis. 1977); school districts, Stemple v. Board of Education of Prince
George's Cty., 464 F. Supp. 258 (D. Md. 1979); Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School
Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Lora v. Board of Education of the City of
New York, 465 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Stubbs v. Kline, 463 F. Supp. 110
(W.D. Pa. 1978); Sherer v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mo. 1977); Hairston v.
Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W.Va. 1976), and welfare agencies, Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Kruse v. Camp-
bell, 431 F. Supp. 186 (E.D. Va. 1977), vacated, 434 U.S. 808 (1978). Sites v. McKen-
zie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. W.Va. 1976).
But cf. Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394
(N.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 551 F.2d 862, rehearing den., 554 F.2d 475
(1976) (court denied cause of action without discussing implication issue).
61 Doe v. New York University, 442 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Barnes v.
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istrative law to the area. -By invoking the doctrines of primary
jurisdiction64 or exhaustion of administrative remedies,65 the
lower courts have either dismissed or stayed private suits prior
to deciding the merits of the cases before them. While often
blurring the distinctions between the two doctrines, the courts
have nevertheless sought to have HEW consider the complaints
prior to full court review.
HEW has argued, however, that its own administrative
procedures are inadequate to resolve individual complaints
under § 504 and has supported individuals who seek to bring
private actions.6 Even though the Senate Labor and Public
Welfare committee indicated that there would be judicial re-
view of complaints at some point,67 a view expressly adopted
by the Lloyd court, the lower courts have in many instances
been reluctant to take jurisdiction of § 504 complaints until
Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977). In Barnes, the district court granted
a preliminary injunction to a plaintiff seeking classroom translators, even though the
private college received no federal funds for the particular program in question.
84 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applied where the court has original
jurisdiction of the claim but some of the factual issues are within the special compe-
tence of an administrative agency-i.e., HEW in the context of § 504. District courts
have invoked the doctrine when considering claims under § 504 in Joyner v. Dumpson,
No. 75-CIV-35 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 1978); Stubbs v. Kline, 463 F. Supp. 110 (W.D. Pa.
1978); Doe v. New York University, 442 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Crawford v.
University of North Carolina, 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
In Doe, the court stated:
Especially in the context of a relatively new and broadly worded statute like
the one in question here, which could flood the courts with new litigation,
administrative interpretation and guidance maybe an important element in
the developing construction and application of the law . . . . Further, it is
not unreasonable to conclude that HEW could bring a greater degree of
flexibility and expertise to bear on these issues.
442 F. Supp. at 524.
See 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19.01 (1958).
9 Exhaustion of administrative remedies is required when the court does not have
original jurisdiction to dispose of the case. Only after administrative remedies have
been pursued can a claimant bring suit to review the administrative determination.
Four federal district court decisions have dismissed or stayed § 504 claims on these
grounds: Joyner v. Dumpson, No. 75-CIV-35 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 1978); Doe v. New
York University, 442 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Sherer v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039
(W.D. Mo. 1977); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 919 (D.
Del. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 47 U.S.L.W. 2811 (3rd Cir. June 4, 1979).
" Whitaker v. Board of Higher Educ. of New York, 461 F. Supp. 99, 108 n.11
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
" See note 43 and accompanying text supra for the substance of the Committee's
comment.
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after HEW has reviewed the complaint. 8 The varying ap-
proaches to this issue make it impossible to assert with any
certainty when a plaintiff may invoke the judicially implied
private right of action prior to utilization of administrative
remedies.
D. The 1978 Amendments and the Subsequent Application of
Cort v. Ash
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 did not contain an express
remedial section; however, § 505 of the 1978 amendments was
included to provide guidelines for enforcement of § 504:
Remedies and Attorney's Fees: (a)(1) The remedies, proce-
dures, and rights set forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1962 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16), including the application
of sections 706(f) through 706(k) shall be available, with re-
spect to any complaint under section 501 of this act, to any
employee or applicant for employment aggrieved by the final
disposition of such complaint, or by the failure to take final
action on such complaint. In fashioning an equitable or af-
firmative action remedy under such section, a court may take
into account the reasonableness of the cost of any necessary
work place accommodation, and the availability of alterna-
tives thereof or other appropriate relief in order to achieve an
equitable and appropriate remedy.
(2) The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be available to any person
aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of
Federal financial assistance or Federal provider of such assis-
tance under section 504 of this Act.
(b) In any action or proceeding to enforce. . . this title, the
court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs."9
Section 505(a)(1) applies only to employees or applicants for
" See cases cited in notes 64-65 supra for each of the cases. Contra, Davis v.
Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th
Cir. 1977); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp.
479 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Whitaker v. Board of Higher Educ. of New York, 461 F. Supp.
94 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
" 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(Supp. 1979).
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employment with the federal government. However, § 505 (a)
(2) provides other aggrieved persons the remedies provided by
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While this provision
emphasizes the legislative precedent for the Act, it does not
clearly answer the question of whether a private right of action
was intended to enforce the Act.70
Few cases have been reported since the 1978 amendments,
and it is likely that most were argued prior to the enactment
of § 505.71 Only in Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center,
Inc.712 did a court expressly construe the amendments. The
Fourth CirCuit decided that Congress intended by its amend-
ment to incorporate all of the provisions of Title VI, including
§ 604. 71 The court rejected an employee's claim brought against
a privately owned nursing home to enjoin termination of her
employment, allegedly due to her vision impairment. The court
based its holding upon two factors: (1) the nursing home was
not a recipient of federal financial assistance; and (2) the fed-
10 In fact, the amendment merely codifies a statement made four years before in
a legislative report:
Section 504 was patterned after, and is almost identical to the anti-
discrimination language of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ...
and section 901 of the Education Amendments of 1972. The section therefore
constitutes the establishment of a broad government policy that programs
receiving Federal financial assistance shall be operated without discrimina-
tion on the basis of handicap ....
S. REP. No. 93-1297, supra note 31, at 6390.
Also, when Congress spoke of other methods of enforcement in the Title VI de-
bates, they were considering not an implied right of action, but enforcement of private
rights through an action under § 1983. At the time of the debates the Fourth Circuit
had permitted such an action in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d
959 (4th Cir. 1963), where the private defendant refused to treat black patients. Other
circuits have since rejected an interpretation of § 1983 which would permit suit in the
absence of state action. See note 12 supra for a list of these cases.
1, Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979); New York Ass'n for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Board of Educ. of New York, Nos. 72-C-356, 72-C-2039 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 28, 1979); Stemple v. Board of Education of Prince George's County, 464 F. Supp.
258 (D. Md. 1979); Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School District, 464 F. Supp. 1104
(N.D. Cal. 1979); Stubbs v. Kline, 463 F. Supp. 110 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
r 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 2895 (1979).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1970) states:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize action
under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to any
employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organi-
zation except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance
is to provide employment.
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eral funds were not provided for the purpose of providing em-
ployment. The second consideration was based upon the inclu-
sion of § 604 of Title VI, which was read to have a limiting
effect on § 504 claims. Because § 505 expressly includes Title
VI remedies and procedures, § 604 acted to deny the plaintiff
a right of action. 4 The Fourth Circuit also commented that the
provision for independent federal employment remedies to the
exclusion of others indicated that Congress did not intend to
include any other employment complaints under § 504.75
1. Title VI Legislative History
Because § 505 refers to Title VI remedies and procedures
for violations of § 504, the legislative history of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 must be studied for indicia of congres-
sional intent as to the implication of a private right of action
in the context of § 504. However, it is not clear from the legisla-
tive history of Title VI whether congressional intent favored a
private right to sue.7" Some legislators arguably assumed there
would be a private right of action.77 Others apparently regarded
" 590 F.2d at 89.
7' Id. For a discussion of employment rights under the Rehabilitation Act, see
Bayh, Foreword to the Symposium Issue on the Employment Rights of the
Handicapped, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 943 (1978); Guy, The Developing Law on Equal
Employment Opportunities for the Handicapped: An Overview and Analysis of the
Major Issues, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 183 (1978); Linn, Uncle Sam Doesn't Want You:
Entering the Federal Stronghold of Employment Discrimination Against Handicapped
Individuals, 27 DE PAUL L. REv. 1047 (1978).
1 Notwithstanding the summary conclusions drawn by some courts, the legisla-
tive record provides no infallible guide.
77 Some representatives clearly thought the Act created an individual right:
This bill is designed for the protection of individuals. When an individual is
wronged, he can invoke the protection to himself, but if he is unable to do
so because of economic distress or because of fear then the federal govern-
ment is authorized to invoke that individual protection for that individual.
110 CONG. REc. H1540 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Lindsay).
Some representatives were concerned about the intrusion of federal power under
Title VI:
Mr. Talmadge That right is enforceable in every court of the land, and the
Senator from Minnesota knows it.
Mr. Humphrey That is correct. The existing law of the land is stated in
section 601. Sections 602 and 603 of H.R. 7152 do not represent an extension
of that law. Those latter sections represent no new power. They represent a
procedural limitation on the power of an affected agency to enforce existing
powers.
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such an action as available only under extant statutes or the
Constitution." Some of the strongest advocates of the bill at-
Mr. Talmadge The people have the authority to go to court, and the Senator
admits that they have that right.
Mr. Humphrey Yes.
110 CONG. REc. S5254 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1964).
Senator Case was concerned about the construction of sections 601 and 602; partic-
ularly the meaning of the phrase "other than a contract of insurance or guaranty" in
the definition of financial assistance:
My only point is that I do not want my embracement of this bill to be
construed as indicating that I believe that the substantive rights of an indi-
vidual as they may be stated in the Constitution, or as they may be stated
in Section 601 are limited in any degree whatsoever,
For whatever purpose section 601 may be operative; but I do not now suggest
that I know of any, except some time there may be a possibility that an
individual would bring suit, or something of that sort.
110 tONG. I C. S5255 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1984).
Senator Humphrey, a chief advocate of the Act, responded:
I thoroughly agree with the Senator, insofar as an individual is con-
cerned. As a citizen of the United States, he has his full Constitutional
rights. He has his right to go to court and institute suit and whatever may
be provided in the law and in the Constitution. There would be no limitation
on the individual. The limitation would be on the qualification of the Federal
agencies.
110 CoNG. REC. S5256 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1984).
Senator Ribicoff, also a supporter of the bill, recognized the possibility of court
action:
If Federal funds are to be dispensed on a non-discriminatory basis, the
only possible remedies must fall into one of two categories: First, action to
end discrimination; or second, an adtion to end the payment of funds. Ob-
viously action to end discrimination is preferable. . . . Title VI follows this
twofold approach. It places primary emphasis on ending discriminations. It
provides withholding of funds as a last resort.
110 CONG. REc. S7065 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1964). The comments of Senator Ribicoff could
refer to an individual action or to one brought by the agency which dispenses the
federal funds in an effort to achieve compliance with the statute. Even though Senator
Ribicoff later stated his preference for an injunctive action to end the discrimination,
he did not make clear whether the plaintiff would be the agency or the aggrieved
individual:
Personally, I think it would be a rare case when funds would actually be cut
off. In most cases alternative remedies, principally lawsuits to end discrimi-
nation, would be the preferable and more effective remedy.
110 CONG. REc. S7067 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1984).
11 In the House of Representatives, Representative Celler indicated that he did not
think there was a private right of action under Title VI:
Actually, no action whatsoever can be taken against anyone until the Federal
agency involved has advised the appropriate person of his failure to comply
with non-discrimination requirements and until voluntary efforts to secure
compliance have failed.
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110 CONG. REc. H1519 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1964).
Representative Gill underlined the moderate character of the enforcement proce-
dure under Title VI:
If you will look at Title VI, you will see very clearly that we have here a
relatively mild form of cut off provision. There is no mandatory or arbitrary
stopping of funds. It merely states the right of all persons not to be denied
the benefits of Federal spending because of race, color, or national origin.
Further, Title VI provides very clearly that the person or agency which is
denied the money, if it desires, can go to the courts. . . and that court can
determine whether or not the cutoff is in accordance with law and whether
or not it was properly done under this statute.
Nowhere in this section do you find a comparable right of legal action
for a person who feels he has been denied his rights to participate in the
benefits of Federal funds. Nowhere. Only those who have been cut off can
go to court and present their claim.
I think you will note that flexibility and caution is the rule of this Title
VI. It allows the administrative agency to try to work out special problems
and to ask for compliance .... I submit that if Title VI errs it is on the side
of mildness.
110 CONG. REc. H2466-67 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1964).
Senator Talmadge found no private right of action in Title VI, relying on his
reading of section 603. 110 CONG. REc. S5253 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1964). Senator Keating
agreed that there was no right of action in the individual citizen, even though he,
unlike Senator Talmadge, would have preferred one.
Under section 603 a State, or a political subdivision of a State, or an
agency of either, which is denied funding because discrimination is taking
place, is given the right of action in court. But there is no correlative right
in the citizen. If funds are granted to discriminatory projects by public
officials, the citizen who is denied the benefits of the project has no correla-
tive right to bring a suit in court and he should have.
Rather than being objectionable because it is too restrictive, section 603
is objectionable . . . because it does not provide sufficient protection for
individual citizens. It seems to me that if we are going to give court protec-
tion to the municipality or the State involved, the citizen should also have
the same right to have court review of his actions.
110 CONG. REc. S5256 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1964) (emphasis supplied).
Senator Humphrey explained that the phrase authorizing enforcement by "other
means authorized by law" was not intended to authorize private suit, but action by
the affected administrative agency:
[S]ection 602, by authorizing the agency to achieve compliance 'by any
other means authorized by law' encourages agencies to find ways to end
racial discrimination without refusing or terminating assistance.
110 CONG. REC. S6544 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1964).
See also 110 CONG. REc. S7063 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1964) (Sen. Pastore); Id. at 7066
(daily ed. Apr. 7, 1964) (Sen. Ribicoff); Id. at 8345 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1964) (Sen.
Proxmire).
Senator Humphrey also underscored his understanding that it would be public
bodies which would protest fund termination, not individuals who would seek to en-
force the law:
Moreover, the agency aggrieved, which would usually be a state or local
governmental authority which had been the recipient of Federal assistance,
could secure judicial review of the action taken .... In fact, a good case could
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tempted to reassure opponents that no new cause of action
would accrue under the new legislation. Whatever Congress
actually intended at the time of enactment, courts have contin-
ued to read those portions of the history which best support
their view.
2. Litigation under Title VW
Most Title VI litigation has been brought against public
entities and therefore, as in § 504 cases, it is often difficult to
discover whether the basis for the decision was Title VI or the
Constitution. In Lau v. Nichols,7" the Supreme Court held that
Title VI was violated where a school district receiving federal
financial assistance failed to provide special English classes or
classes in Chinese for plaintiff class of Chinese-Americans.
While Lau was decided on the basis of Title VI by a unanimous
Court, four justices indicated separate reasons for holding the
defendant liable under Title VI ° These members of the Court
apparently viewed the Lau plaintiffs as third party beneficiar-
ies of the federal contract with the school district., Two of
be made that a remedy is provided for the state or local official who is
practicing discrimination, but none is provided for the victim of that dis-
crimination.
110 CONG. REc. S6562 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1964) (emphasis added).
Finally, even those who had supported the express creation of such a private right
of action acknowledged its absence. Commenting on the Department of Justice revi-
sion of the original draft of Title VI, Senator Keating remarked:
As Senator Ribicoff has pointed out, both he and I felt that the original
Title VI proposal was objectionable in that it emphasized the cutting off of
Federal funds rather than the ending of discrimination. We favored a provi-
sion allowing the administrator to institute a civil action to eliminate the
discrimination and we favored judicial review of the determination to with-
hold Federal funds.
Parenthetically, while we favored the inclusion of the right to sue on the
part of the agency, the State, or the facility which was deprived of Federal
funds, we also favored the inclusion of a provision granting the right to sue
to the person suffering from discrimination. This was not included in the bill.
However, both the Senator from Connecticut and I are grateful that our other
suggestions were adopted by the Justice Department.
110 CONG. Rac. S7065 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1965) (emphasis added).
79 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
8 Stewart, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which Burger, C.J., and
Blackmun, J., joined. White, J., also concurred separately. Finally, Blackmun, J.,
concurred in a separate opinion joined by Burger, C.J.
1, Id. at 570 n.2. (Stewart, J., concurring).
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these justices emphasized the large number of students in-
volved, reserving opinion on whether a smaller number of stu-
dents or a single child could obtain relief under Title VI. 2
Significantly, the majority opinion failed to mention the impli-
cation doctrine while allowing private enforcement of Title VI.
The third party beneficiary theory had been advanced by
the Fifth Circuit in Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon." In
that early school desegregation case, the court rejected the de-
fendant's argument that, because the plaintiff children were
military dependents, they were not within the jurisdiction of
the state. 4 The court of appeals accepted the district court's
theory that the plaintiffs could sue under Title VI as third
party beneficiaries of the contract between the federal govern-
ment and the state for the education of military dependents,
and they therefore had a federally protected right to a desegre-
gated education." The Bossier court relied upon Rigsby, stat-
ing that "[iun the absence of a procedure through which the
individuals protected by section 601's prohibition may assert
their rights under it, violations of the law are cognizable by the
courts."8"
Some Title VI actions, however, have been against private
entities. In Flanagan v. President and Directors of Georgetown
College,8" a private college was held to have violated Title VI
by awarding scholarships to black and white students on the
basis of race. Similarly, in Laufman v. Oakley Building and
Loan Associationms a building and loan association was en-
joined from continuing alleged "redlining" practices in its
lending policies. Because in most instances the cases brought
under Title VI were also brought on the jurisdictional basis of
S2 Id. at 572. (Blackmun, J., & Burger, C.J., concurring). See Justice White's
separate opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 379
n.1, (1978), in which he notes that jurisdiction in Lau was obtained under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. This statement would furnish a reasonable explanation for the Court's failure to
discuss the doctrine of implication.
370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 851.
' Id. at 850.
g5 Id. at 852. Chief Justice Burger, then a member of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, sat by designation on the Fifth Circuit for this appeal.
417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976).
Rs 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
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42 U.S.C. § 1983,89 it is not possible to assert that the cases are
authority for the proposition that Title VI may be enforced by
a direct private right of action. The Supreme Court's recent
federal civil rights decisions have failed to resolve patently the
issue, but do provide a substantial body of dictum.
3. Recent Supreme Court Decisions
While the 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act
were before Congress, the Supreme Court decided the well pub-
licized case of Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke." In Bakke, the Court found it unnecessary to decide the
existence of a private right of action under Title VI because:
(1) the University was a state agency subject to suit under §
1983; and (2) the constitutional and statutory standards were
held to be coextensive. Although the legislators may have con-
sidered Bakke when they added § 505(a) (2), such a factor can-
not be considered conclusive because only five of the justices
considered the implication issue. Justice Powell assumed the
existence of a private right because the issue had not been
argued below." Justice Stevens, writing for Justices Stewart,
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, expressly found a private
right of action under Title VI.92 Justice White wrote a separate
dissent which categorically rejected the existence of a private
right of suit,93 And dissenting Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun failed to express an opinion on the issue. 4
One week after deciding Bakke, the Court granted certio-
rari in Cannon v. University of Chicago.5 This case presented
the issue avoided in Bakke-whether a private right of action
against a private entity should be implied under a similarly
worded statute, Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972. Title IX is, like § 504, functionally identical to Title VI
89 See note 10 supra for the text of the statute.
90 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
9 Id. at 283.
92 Id. at 419-21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
,Id. at 379-87 (White, J., dissenting).
, Id. at 324.
9' 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979). See also DeLaCruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2416 (1979) (a § 1983 civil action brought to enforce rights
created under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972).
[Vol. 68
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." The difference between Title
IX and § 504 is minimal; one applies to sex discrimination, the
other to handicapped discrimination. Also, Title IX applies
only to educational programs, while § 504 applies to any pro-
gram receiving federal financial assistance. The problems of
enforcement are substantially similar: both are enforced by
HEW and were originally based on Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
Ms. Cannon applied for admission to and was rejected by
two privately supported medical schools." The Seventh Circuit
refused to permit Ms. Cannon to maintain a private action
under Title IX upon two grounds: (1) it could find no basis
under the Cort standard to do so; and (2) an administrative
procedure existed through HEW for action on complaints of
discrimination." The circuit court distinguished its own Lloyd
decision primarily on the basis of the existence of the HEW
procedures." It similarly rejected the plaintiff's contention that
the mention of Title IX in the Attorney's Fee Act of 1976100
constituted sufficient congressional intent to establish a pri-
vate cause of action.'0'
The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Stevens wrote for
the majority, positing that congressional intent favored a pri-
vate right of action."0 2 Applying the four-part Cort v. Ash test,
Justice Stevens found that each element of the standard sup-
ported the affirmative proposition. First, he reasoned that the
"No person" language of the Act indicated that Congress in-
tended for Title IX to benefit a special class of persons and was
not a simple ban on disciminatory conduct.' Justice Stevens
" No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any education program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance ....
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 1973).
97 99 S. Ct. at 1949 n.2.
" 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 1082.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. 1977).
,0, 559 F.2d at 1079.
£02 99 S. Ct. at 1961. See the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens in Bakke, 438
U.S. at 408.
'" 99 S. Ct. at 1956.
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examined congressional history to answer the second
test-whether Congress intended to grant or deny a private
right. Particularly important were the remarks of Senator Mar-
low Cook regarding another section of the education amend-
ments which permitted attorney's fees in actions against local
educational agencies, states, state agencies and the United
States to enforce Title VI.104 Justice Stevens also noted that at
the time of the enactment of Title IX, several lower courts had
permitted private actions based on Title VI,11 and since Title
IX was based on Title VI, Congress adopted their mandate
through silence. Accordingly, Congress' inaction was inter-
preted to have a similar effect in the context of Title IX.,0
The third test of Cort is whether a private right of action
would disrupt the legislative objective of affording individual
rights.'"" Justice Stevens reasoned that this goal might be more
efficiently achieved by a court order, rather than by termina-
tion of funds.' He also posited that the procedural limitations
contained in § 602 of Title VI were merely limitations upon
agencies, not on individuals who could seek to enforce the stat-
ute. ' Justice Stevens observed that these limitations were
,01 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. 1973).
'I 99 S. Ct. at 1959 n.28. Justice Stevens noted that a distinguished panel of the
Fifth Circuit had decided Bossier Parish in 1967 and that it had been widely relied
upon subsequently. Id. at 1957 n.20.
'c' Id. at 1958.
10 Id. at 1962.
' Id. at 1962 n.41. Justice Stevens commented that HEW advocated a "flexible"
approach to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id. at 1953 n.8. It is in the
acceptance of HEW's flexible standard regarding administrative remedies that the
Court's opinion is most confusing. On the one hand, the fact that HEW could not
perform its administrative enforcement duties was taken as indicating the need for
judicial intervention; on the other hand, the Court decided that there was no likelihood
that litigation would become burdensome.
The HEW enforcement plan for 1978, 42 Fed. Reg. 39,824 (1977), demonstrated
the backlog of existing complaints, which numbered 1,022. Considering projected new
complaints, HEW set a goal of 1,501 complaints to be resolved in the new fiscal year.
Id. at 38,829.
" 99 S. Ct. at 1965. The procedural limitations set prerequisites to enforcement
action.
[N]o such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned
has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with
the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by
voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant
or continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement im-
posed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency
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merely an attempt to prevent the government agencies from
being liable. '
Finally, the Court held that the rights protected by Title
IX were clearly within the federal purview, and not restricted
to the concern of the states.' Thus, on all four parts of the Cort
test the Supreme Court found support for an implied right of
action in Title IX.
The Court dismissed the argument of the universities that
private litigation would be burdensome by pointing out that
Title VI litigation had not proven to be so, even though it had
been possible since 1965.112 This comment is particularly cu-
rious, because even as late as the Bakke decision in 1978, the
private right of action issue under Title VI was unresolved,
particularly with regard to private defendants."13 Moreover, as
Justice White pointed out in his dissent, the cases cited by the
majority, in support of the statement that a judicially created
private right of action was known to Congress at the time of the
Title IX debates, were in each instance cases either involving
suits against federal officials or ones brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.114 Justice White reemphasized his reading of the legisla-
tive history of Title VI, which he had presented in a separate
opinion in Bakke."' There, he had argued strongly against an
implied right of action under Title VI.
Justice Powell, who wrote the Court's opinion in Bakke,
dissented in Cannon. ' In Cannon, the issue was not whether
there had been discrimination, but whether the courts had
original jurisdiction of an individual suit to enforce Title IX.
Justice Powell discussed the history of implication and com-
mented that there had been historically "an almost invariable
shall file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative
jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of the
circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall become
effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (Supp. 1978).
,,0 99 S. Ct. at 1967.
' Id. at 1963.
,,2 Id. at 1964.
", See text accompanying notes 79-89 supra for conflicting views on the issue.
"1 99 S. Ct. at 1973.
11 438 U.S. at 379.
1 99 S. Ct. at 1974.
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refusal to imply private actions, absent a complete failure of
alternative enforcement mechanisms and a clear expression of
legislative intent to create such a remedy "1.... " Because of
the willingness of the lower federal courts to permit such im-
plied rights of action, Justice Powell found that the Cort test
permits the court too readily to override congressional intent.",
Accordingly, he argued for implication of a private right of
action only if there were the "most compelling evidence of af-
firmative Congressional intent" to create such a remedy."19 To
the extent that Cort had been liberally construed by the federal
courts, Justice Powell stated that its standard is unconstitu-
tional.1 20
Even though Justices Rehnquist and Stewart concurred in
the majority opinion, they indicated their future unwillingness
to approve of an implied private right of action. Agreeing with
Justice Stevens that it would be far better if Congress made its
intentions known, they commented:
Not only is it "far better" for Congress to so specify when it
intends private litigants to have a cause of action, but for this
very reason this Court in the future should be extremely re-
luctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity on
the part of the Legislative Branch.'2'
"I Id. at 1979. He emphasized that even while the test appeared to be liberally
fashioned, the Cort opinion narrowly construed the test, rejecting a private right of
action under 18 U.S.C. § 610.
"I Id. at 1980. Justice Powell cited three § 504 cases in which an implied right
was permitted, United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977);
Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); and Lloyd v. Regional
Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977), alongside seventeen other cases where
the circuit courts of appeals had found a private right of action under a facially neutral
federal statute.
"1 99 S. Ct. at 1985.
' Id.
2I Id. at 1968. An indication that the Supreme Court intends to imply a private
right of action sparingly is demonstrated by Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S.Ct. 2479 (1979). The Court refused to permit a private
action against an accounting firm for allegedly violating § 17(a) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934. The majority noted that during the recent Court term no less
than five cases had presented the issue of implication in a statute which did not
expressly provide a private right of action. Id. at 2482. Justice Rehnquist stated that
the Court had, since its earlier decision in Borak, applied a stricter standard for
implication of a private right of action. Id. at 2490, citing Cannon.
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In the first Supreme Court case construing § 504,
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 122 the Court unani-
mously reversed a Fourth Circuit decision which had required
a college to admit a deaf-handicapped nursing student and to
assist affirmatively her in participating in the program. Many
observers expected the Court's decision to provide an authori-
tative interpretation of the 1978 amendments to the Rehabili-
tation Act. The Court itself had indicated that the implication
issue would be addressed."' Although the Davis case aided in
interpreting the statute, it did not clarify the meaning of § 505,
because the defendant college was subject to private suit for
acts under color of state law under § 1983.124 A unanimous
Court expressed no view as to whether a private cause of action
is available to enforce § 504,12 and did not mention the Cannon
decision. The implication issue may therefore not be as well
settled as the Cannon majority intimated. Of course, those
discriminators subject to the prohibition of § 1983 are still
amenable to a private action under § 504.
4. The Future of an Implied Right of Action Under § 504
Davis' avoidance of the issue of whether an action may be
implied under § 504 will cause the federal courts to continue
to struggle with the issue. Defendants acting under color of
state law, as demonstrated in Bakke and Davis, will be subject
to suit under the Act by way of § 1983.
The reluctance of Justices Stewart and Rehnquist to imply
a right of action under a federal statute in Cannon indicates a
shift of power in the Court. If these justices were to join the
dissenting justices in Cannon, a majority could be formed
which would deny the existence of a private cause of action
under § 504. However, now that the Court has interpreted the
legislative and litigative history of Title VI as favoring a private
right of action, it will be difficult for the Court to decide that
Congress, which so clearly had Title VI and Title IX in mind
when enacting § 504, did not intend to create the same reme-
1- 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979).
123 New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 99 S. Ct. 1355, 1363 n.17 (1979).
"1 99 S. Ct. at 2366 n.5.
12 Id.
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dies for the handicapped.
The administrative remedies under the Act have been
called inadequate by HEW itself.12 It is in these circumstances
that the Court seems willing to provide relief. However, the
record which Congress has developed of amending the Rehabil-
itation Act'27 may cause the courts to deny relief to private
litigants in order to force Congress expressly to grant such a
private right of suit.
I. THE DEFINITION OF AN "OTHERWISE QUALIFIED HANDICAPPED
PERSON"
A. Legislative History
The prohibition of discrimination against handicapped
persons finally enacted as § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 was first introduced in 1971, as an amendment to Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.28 The bill was never reported
out of committee, but the provisions of that proposal later
reappeared in a somewhat altered form as part of the Rehabili-
tation Act.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act sought to prohibit
discrimination against "otherwise qualified handicapped indi-
viduals," as those persons were defined in § 706(6) of the Act.
That definition could be read to mean that only persons who
had been receiving assistance from established rehabilitation
programs were to receive protection:
The term handicapped individual means any individual who:
(a) has a physical or mental disability which for such individ-
ual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to em-
26 See note 66 supra for authority showing HEW's self-debasement.
'27 Congress has amended the Act twice in five years.
'" H.R. 12154, 92nd Cong. 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. H45945 (1971) would have
inserted the term "physical or mental handicap" after the word "color" in § 601 of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. It also would have limited the application of the
prohibition by adding, after 'Federal financial assistance," the statement "unless lack
of such physical or mental handicap is a bona fide qualiffcation reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of such program or activity." S. 3987 incorporated the lan-
guage of H.R. 12154, according to the Senate Labor and Public Welfare report, but it
contained no exception for a bona fide qualification related to the program. S. REP.
No. 93-319, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 70, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2026 at 2087.
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ployment, and (b) can reasonably be expected to benefit in
terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation serv-
ices provided pursuant to Titles I and III of this Act.'29
Virtually no legislative history is available to clarify the pur-
pose of the Act. One sentence in the Senate Labor and Public
Welfare Committee's report explains the enactment of § 504 as
a statement of general policy against handicapped discrimina-
tion.11 The purpose section of the Act states that it is intended
to "promote and expand employment opportunities in the pub-
lic and private sectors" for handicapped persons. 3'
Because the parameters of the protected class were
couched in terms of the ability to benefit from rehabilitation
programs established with federal or state funds, the imple-
menting regulations for § 503 which were issued by the Depart-
ment of Labor in June, 1974, required certification of the indi-
vidual handicap. 32 The certification could be obtained from
the vocational rehabilitation agencies listed by the Employ-
ment Standards Administration, a division of the Department
of Labor. 33
After the Department of Labor issued these regulations,
Congress amended the Act. The Senate Labor and Public Wel-
fare Committee supplemented the sparse legislative history of
the Act, noting that the primary purpose of § 504 was to
"prevent discrimination against all handicapped individuals,
regardless of their need for or ability to benefit from vocational
rehabilitation services .. . ."I" The Committee recommended
the adoption of amendments to clarify this legislative intent,
'12 29 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. 1974) (prior to 1974 amendments).
I" See text accompanying note 7 supra for a discussion of the legislative history
of § 504.
,"I Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (1973) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1979)).
132 39 Fed. Reg. 20,566 (1974) (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. §§ 60-741).
'a Id.
" Rehabilitation Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111(a), 88 Stat. 1617
(1974) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. 1979)). The Senate Labor and Public
Welfare Committee reported that "[the 1973 definition] has proven to be troublesome
in its application to provisions of the Act such as sections 503 and 504 because of its
orientation toward employment and its relation to vocational rehabilitation services."
S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6373 at 6388.
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and those recommendations were followed in December, 1974.
Another sentence was added to the definition, and the
amended definition made it clear that prior receipt of benefits
or official certification under the Act was unnecessary:
The term handicapped individual means . . .any person
who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more of such person's major life activities,
(ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment.135
' Even though the statute expressed a flat prohibition against
discrimination, it remained for the responsible administrative
agency to flesh out guidelines for implementing the Act.
B. The HEW Regulations
As noted above, 36 assignment of the enforcement duty for
the Act was not executed until President Ford issued Executive
Order 11914 in April, 1976.37 The Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare was assigned the responsibility for coordi-
nating the enforcement programs of all federal departments
and agencies which extend financial assistance. 3 The Presi-
dent directed the Secretary to establish standards for deter-
mining (1) which individuals are protected by the Act; and (2)
whether discrimination has occurred.' 3'
1. The Definition of "Otherwise Qualified Handicapped
Person"
Pursuant to the executive order, the Secretary of HEW
issued an "Intent to Issue Regulations" in May, 1976, and held
meetings throughout the country during the next thirty days to
"1 29 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. 1975) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. 1979)).
This amendment applies only to titles IV and V of the Act; only the application to
title V is discussed here.
I See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the delay in
enforcement of the Rehabilitation Act.
1" 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976). Handicap rights activists secured an order to com-
pel HEW to issue final regulations for § 504 of the Act. HEW contended that none were
necessary in view of the plain language of the Act. Cherry v. Matthews, 419 F. Supp.
922 (D.D.C. 1976).
'' S. REP. No. 93-1297, supra note 29, at 6391.
,' 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976).
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hear responses to the proposal. 4 ' The Secretary specifically
solicited responses to the proposed definition of "otherwise
qualified handicapped person." He considered this action nec-
essary because of the lack of "substantive legislative debate"
on the Act."'
The Secretary pointed out two major difficulties in
drafting regulations for the enforcement of § 504: (1)
"[h]andicapped persons may require different treatment in
order to be afforded equal access;' 4 2 and (2) the "diversity of
existing handicaps and the differing degree to which persons
may be affected" compound the problem."' Consequently, he
expressed an intent to exclude environmental, cultural and
economic disadvantages from the coverage of the Act, but to
include "specific learning disabilities" such as developmental
aphasia, brain injury and dyslexia.'
To accommodate the second portion of the statutory defi-
nition, which requires that the person who "has a record of"
handicap be protected, the Secretary construed Congress' in-
tent to include those who actually had the handicap, as well
as those who were incorrectly diagnosed as having such a condi-
tion.14 5 Finally, the portion of the definition providing that per-
sons who are "regarded as having" the condition be protected
was explained to include those who may have a temporary
adverse drug reaction, but who thereafter are incorrectly
treated as though having permanent and major impairment. "'
"0 Secretary Matthews stated:
Since it appears to be the case that the implications of this legislation have
not been elaborated before the general public in sufficient detail, it seems
appropriate before issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, to solicit public
comment on certain key issues which any proposed regulation would, in all
likelihood address.
41 Fed. Reg. 20,296 (1976).
1' There is almost no substantive legislative history surrounding the
development and enactment of section 504. There were, for example, no
public hearings accompanying the original bills and there was almost no
substantive floor debate.
Id.
142 Id.
"u Id.
14 Id. at 20,298.
'45 Id.
"I Id. at 20,298-99.
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The proposed regulatory definition of a handicapped person
included:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfig-
urement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the fol-
lowing body systems: neurological; musculo-skeletal; special
sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovas-
cular; reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and
lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; (B) any mental or psycholog-
ical disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syn-
drome, emotional and mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities; .. .147
The Secretary explained that HEW had adopted the lan-
guage "qualified handicapped person" rather than "otherwise
qualified" in the regulations because, for example, while a
blind person might have all the qualifications for employment
as a bus driver except sight, such a person would not be quali-
fied under the Act.' The Secretary added that "otherwise
qualified" might be mistaken to mean "except for" rather than
the proper "in spite of' interpretation."'
After the thirty day comment period lapsed, HEW ana-
lyzed the comments and announced proposed regulations. A
particularly difficult issue raised in the regulations was the
inclusion of drug addicts and alcoholics in the definition of a
handicapped individual.5 ' However, because recipients of fed-
eral assistance have commonly excluded such persons from
medical treatment on the basis of the addiction, such persons
were retained within the regulation- definition. The Depart-
ment also responded to comments suggesting the exclusion of
persons on the basis of mental illness. It reasoned that, unless
a college or university could show that admission of such a
person would impede the performance of other students, exclu-
sion would constitute discrimination under § 504.'15
HEW interpreted the broad statutory mandate as an addi-
"I Id. at 20,305 (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)). The final regulation
omitted former paragraph (C) from the definition because it failed to clarify the mean-
ing.
148 Id. at 20,299.
149 Id.
'' 41 Fed. Reg. 29,548 (1976) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84).
"' Id. at 29,549.
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tional impetus to avoid a narrow description of the protected
class, which would include only severe or permanent conditions
or would exclude addicts. '52 This comment by HEW officials
indicates that they, too, were concerned by the legislative
breadth of § 504 causing those affected to seek judicial action
to provide the requested precision.
It was not until May 4, 1977, that HEW issued the final
regulations for implementation of § 504.153 This delay under-
scores the complex issues involved and the difficulty which
HEW experienced in developing regulations which would sat-
isfy its enforcement obligation. '54 Although there were impor-
tant changes in the final regulations, the definition of an
"otherwise qualified person" remained virtually unchanged, in
spite of protests regarding the inclusion of addicts and alcohol-
ics.
The HEW definition of "otherwise qualified handicapped
individual" has received limited judicial construction, primar-
ily because the issues of the existence of a private right of
action and the requirement of exhaustion of administrative
remedies are still unresolved. Two cases, however, have ex-
plored the outer boundaries of the affirmative duty required.
In Kampmeier v. Nyquist,'55 the Second Circuit interpreted the
language of § 504 to permit exclusion of visually impaired stu-
dents from contact sports where there was "substantial justifi-
cation" for the school's policy. 5 Also, in Doe v. New York
University, 5 7 the court refused to decide whether the plaintiff,
suffering from an emotional illness, was an intended benefici-
ary of the Act. It referred the action to HEW to be reviewed
under its complaint procedure.'
152 Id.
'11 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84).
'51 Over seven hundred comments were received in response to the proposed rule.
Id. It was apparently unusual for a regulation to receive this significant volume of
response. Plausible explanations include: (1) the breadth of the regulation; (2) the
extent of the practices covered; and (3) the fact that by this time federal financial
recipients had considerable experience with the federal regulatory process.
'5 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977).
',' Id. at 299.
'57 442 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
's Id. at 524. See also Joyner v. Dumpson, 75-CIV-35 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 1978);
Sherer v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mo. 1977); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical
Center, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 919 (D. Del. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1247
(3d Cir. 1979).
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2. The Standard For Determining the Existence of
Discrimination
The HEW regulations adopted an "effect" standard for
the determination of discrimination, both implicitly, by requir-
ing the comparability of services for handicapped and non-
handicapped persons, and explicitly, by prohibiting recipients
from "utiliz[ing] criteria (i) which have the effect of subject-
ing qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the
basis of handicap." 5 ' Examples of the standard's impact were
contained in the regulation section for higher education. The
regulations prohibited the use of admissions criteria which
have a disproportionately adverse effect on handicapped per-
sons or the imposition of any academic course requirements
which have the effect of discriminating on the basis of handi-
cap. ' If a particular requirement has the prohibited effect, the
school or college must "make such modifications to its aca-
demic requirements as are necessary to ensure that such re-
quirements do not discriminate or have the effect of discrimi-
nating. . .. "I"
Several Title VI cases also support the requirement that plaintiffs exhaust HEW
administrative procedures. Green Street Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932; Santiago v. Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Johnson v. Chester, 413 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Green v. Cauthen, 379 F. Supp.
361 (D.S.C. 1974).
See note 95 supra and accompanying text for discussion of this issue in Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 99 S.Ct. 1946 (1979).
," 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(3).
," 45 C.F.R. § 84.41(2).
,e 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(a). There is some indication that the Supreme Court is
moving away from the "effect" standard it established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), where an otherwise neutral employment policy-the requirement
of a high school diploma-was held to have the effect of excluding racial minorities in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). In Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), a constitutional challenge to a police testing program
which disproportionately eliminated minority applicants, the Court held that, in con-
stitutional cases, some showing of discriminatory purpose is required. In 1978, the
Court held, in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 98 S. Ct. 2943 (1978) and Board
of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 569 F.2d 169 (1st. Cir. 1978) vacated,
99 S. Ct. 295 (1978), that a showing of discriminatory effect was only the beginning of
the inquiry and that an employer must be allowed to introduce evidence which bears
on his specific motive. See also New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 99 S. Ct. 1355
(1979). See Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discrimi-
natory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 UNIv. IM. L. F. 961, for a thorough
discussion of the changing standards applied to determine the presence of illegal dis-
crimination.
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Public elementary and secondary school systems were re-
quired to admit handicapped students in regular classrooms,
interpreting the legislative mandate to mean that handicapped
persons have a right to participate "in the most integrated
setting appropriate." '62 Auxiliary aids, such as translators or
braille books, were required where the absence of such aids
would have the effect of discriminating against handicapped
students. '63 HEW speculated that such aids would usually be
available from state vocational programs or from charitable
sources. 6 '
The HEW prediction was not totally accurate. For in-
stance, deaf students have brought suit against several col-
leges, asserting that the denial of classroom interpreters consti-
tutes an effective denial of access to a federally assisted educa-
tion program, and thus is prohibited by § 504. 16 The earliest
of these cases was Barnes v. Converse College, 6 in which a deaf
teacher seeking to maintain her accreditation as a teacher en-
rolled in a private college. The district court, although reluc-
tant to reach the result, rejected the college's fiscal argument,
and granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the college
from further denial of the requested aid.' 7
C. The 1978 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act
In 1978, after substantial judicial construction of the Act
and its implementing regulations, Congress acted to clarify the
MI 45 C.F.R. § 84.34. Cases challenging the appropriateness of the education pro-
vided for handicapped children have been brought in several district courts. Boxall v.
Sequoia Union High School District, 464 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Stemple v.
Board of Educ. of Prince George's County, 464 F. Supp. 258 (D. Md. 1979); New York
Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Lora v.
Board of Educ. of City of New York, 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Stubbs v.
Kline, 463 F. Supp. 110 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School &
Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Howards v. Friendswood Independent
School District, 454 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Sharer v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039
(W.D. Mo. 1977); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W.Va. 1976).
1" 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d).
'M 42 Fed. Reg. 22,693 (1977).
HI Camenisch v. University of Texas, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8336 (W.D. Tex. 1978);
Crawford v. University of North Carolina, 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Barnes
v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977).
' 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977).
,, See note 63 supra for the district court's opinion.
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language of § 504 and the definition of an "otherwise qualified
handicapped individual." ' 8
1. Exclusion of Active Drug Abusers and Alcoholics
The 1978 amendments excluded drug abusers and alcohol-
ics from the protection of the Act's employment discrimination
sections if the current use of alcohol or drugs "prevents such
individuals from performing the duties of the job in question"
or if their use would constitute a "direct threat to the property
or the safety of others."'69
The House Conference Report on the Rehabilitation, Com-
prehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amend-
ments of 1978 explained the policy behind the exclusion.7 0 The
Report emphasized that only those who were in need of rehabil-
itation services were to be excluded, not those who were reha-
bilitated already. "This protects otherwise qualified self-
reformed or rehabilitated alcoholics from unreasonable dis-
crimination."'' The Report noted that such active abusers
would continue to be eligible for federally funded rehabilitation
services." 2
The apparent legislative understanding that employment
discrimination is prohibited by § 504 comports with that of
many judicial interpretations of the statute. 3 However, the
federal circuit courts which have considered the issue under the
analogous Title IX have decided that Title IX does not apply
"I Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, tit. I, § 122(a)(1), 92 Stat. 2984 (1978).
29 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. 1979).
170 H.R. REP. No. 95-1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess 3, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7312.
"I, Id. at 7333-34.
172 Id.
"I See, e.g., Coleman v. Darden, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8980 (10th Cir. 1979) (blind-
ness); Ryan v. F.D.I.C., 565 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (unspecified physical disability);
Counts v. U.S. Postal Service, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8788 (N.D. Fla. 1978) (epilepsy);
Whitaker v. Board of Higher Educ. of New York, 461 F. Supp. 99 (F.D.N.Y. 1978)
(alcoholism); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (drug addiction);
Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (epilepsy). For
a more detailed discussion of employment rights, see Bayh, Foreword to the Sympo-
sium Issue on the Employment Rights of the Handicapped, 27 DE PAuL L. REv. 943
(1978); Guy, The Developing Law on Equal Employment Opportunities for the Handi-
capped: An Overview and Analysis of the Major Issues, 7 U. BALT. L. REv. 183 (1978).
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to employment, due to the absence of a nexus between the
purpose of the funding and the employment discrimination.1
74
The only court of appeals to consider the 1978 amendments in
the context of an employment complaint similarly found that
the inclusion of Title VI remedies includes the limitations of
that statute as well. The Fourth Circuit, in Trageser v. Libbie
Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 1 75 decided that, because of the lim-
itation contained in § 604 of Title VI, unless the purpose of the
federal funding is to provide employment, handicapped indi-
viduals would have no action under § 504.
The exclusion of alcoholics and drug abusers from the
aegis of § 504 in the employment setting may discourage future
actions such as that brought by methadone users in New York
Transit Authority v. Beazer.171 In Beazer, participants in a re-
habilitation program who had been denied employment as bus
drivers unsuccessfully sought relief under § 504 as well as Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
2. Agency Enforcement Regulations
The 1978 amendments made two significant changes with
regard to agency enforcement. First, Congress expanded the
application of § 504 in the 1978 amendments, specifically in-
cluding programs conducted by executive agencies and the
Postal Service. '77 Secondly, the amendments also require that
each agency promulgate enforcement regulations, and that
,7, Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir. 1979), petition for
cert. filed 48 U.S.L.W. 3118 (U.S. Aug. 6, 1979) (No. 79-200); Romeo Community
Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979); Jr. College District of St. Louis v.
Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed 48 U.S.L.W. 3118 (U.S.
Aug. 6, 1979) (No. 79-201).
,'5 590 F.2d 87 (4th cir. 1978), cert. denied, U.S. (1979).
176 99 S. Ct. 1355 (1979). The Supreme Court failed to consider the Rehabilitation
Act claim under § 503 in this case, preferring to decide the case on the basis of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It refused to accept mere statistical proof as
sufficient to prove discrimination absent other evidence of a discriminatory purpose.
Id. at 1358.
M These amendments were necessary to avoid the results of the court decisions
in Coleman v. Darden, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8980 (10th Cir. 1979); and Counts v. U.S.
Postal Service, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8788 (N.D. Fla. 1978). A discussion of discrimina-
tion in federal government employment is contained in Linn, Uncle Sam Doesn't Want
You: Entering the Federal Stronghold of Employment Discrimination Against Handi-
capped Individuals, 27 DE PAUL L. REv. 1047 (1978).
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they be submitted to the appropriate congressional committee
for approval at least thirty days before their effective date. 78
This latter provision may prove to be the most significant
alteration of the original Act. Agencies will receive congres-
sional supplement to the sparse legislative history of § 504. For
example, Congress could: (1) require modification of the
"effect" standard contained in the current regulations; (2) ex-
amine the regulations for conformity with legislative in-
tent-especially with regard to the protected class; (3) apply
the necessary political realism regarding costs and enforce-
ment; as well as (4) maintain appropriate levels of federal
funding to allow agency compliance. Fund recipients and the
courts will have the benefit of a deliberative rule-making proce-
dure and may be assured that the regulations represent an
authorized interpretation of the Act.
3. Provision for Civil Action By Federal Employee
The 1978 Amendments also established remedies to pro-
tect applicants for federal jobs and federal employees which
permit a private action after exhausting administrative proce-
dures." 9 Upon receipt of final notice of agency action, the com-
plainant has thirty days to file a civil action against the agency.
Significantly, Congress did not establish comparable remedies
for non-federal employees, choosing instead to make explicit
the incorporation of Title VI remedies. The expressio unius
est exclusio alterius ° maxim of statutory construction would
indicate that Congress did not intend to establish a private
right of action to enforce complaints of employment discrimi-
nation in a non-federal context.
D. Southeastern Community College v. Davis
The HEW regulations require program modification when
discrimination against "otherwise qualified" handicapped stu-
178 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1979).
"1 29 U.S.C. § 794a (Supp. 1979). See text accompanying note 69 supra for text
of this amendment.
' The expression of one excludes others. BLACK's LAW DIaIoNARY 692 (4th rev.
ed. 1968).
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dents is present.' 8' The question of whether a program may
consider a handicap when deciding to admit a student, or
whether it must ignore the handicap and decide only whether
the applicant could meet the program requirements without
special accommodation, was presented in the case of
Southeastern Community College v. Davis.'82
Frances Davis, a licensed practical nurse, applied for ad-
mission to the associate degree nursing program at a North
Carolina community college. That particular program would
have made Ms. Davis eligible for state licensure as a registered
nurse. After personal interviews, she was examined by an au-
diologist who diagnosed her as having "bilateral, sensorineural
hearing loss.""' Although a hearing aid would permit her to
hear sounds, she would not be able to understand normal spo-
ken speech. Ms. Davis had lipreading skills, but could only
understand spoken words when the speaker was facing her.8 4
The college sought the opinion of the Director of the State
Board of Nursing to determine whether, after completion of the
program, Ms. Davis would be eligible for certification. The
Executive Director recommended that Davis be denied admis-
sion, both because she would not be able to participate safely
in the clinical training program and because she could not
practice as a registered nurse upon graduation.'' After the col-
lege reconsidered its decision to deny Ms. Davis admission and
refused to change its position, Ms. Davis brought suit.'
The district court concluded that the college's decision to
deny admission to Ms. Davis did not violate § 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act. The district judge relied upon the dictionary
definition of the statutory language "otherwise qualified" and
decided that § 504 would not be violated if the applicant would
be unable to "fully and effectively participate" in the pro-
gram. ' 7 Also, the court concluded that Ms. Davis' handicap
"I See note 161 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the modification
requirement.
192 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979).
"I Id. at 2364.
19' Id.
115 Id.
"' 424 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
J Id. at 1345.
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prevented her from safely performing her duties in the training
program and in the profession.' 8
After the district court rendered its opinion, the HEW
regulations were published. '89 Ms. Davis appealed the decision
to the Fourth Circuit in light of the new regulations."10 The
court of appeals held that the district court erred in finding
that the plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified" within the
meaning of § 504."'° On the basis of the HEW regulations,9 2 it
found that the college should have focused on Davis' academic
and technical qualifications rather than the nature of her hand-
icap.'93 The court remanded the case to the district court for
reconsideration"4 and also suggested that the college might be
required to modify the nursing program in order to accommo-
date the plaintiff. The court commented that affirmative con-
duct on the part of certain entities under § 504 was required
and might be necessary here even if it proved to be expensive. 15
The college successfully applied for certiorari, contending
that Ms. Davis was not "otherwise qualified" within the mean-
ing of the Act. It argued that it should be able to impose physi-
cal qualifications for admission to the nursing program. The
Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, agreed with the col-
lege. 9'
Justice Powell wrote for the Court in what was the Su-
preme Court's first opportunity to construe § 504. He began
with the statutory language and decided that the terms of the
statute do "not compel educational institutions to disregard
the disabilities of handicapped individuals or to make substan-
tial modifications in their programs to allow disabled persons
" Id. at 1345-46.
The regulations were effective on June 6, 1977.
' See text accompanying notes 137-158 supra for a discussion of the HEW regula-
tions promulgated in 1977.
1"1 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978).
,12 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3) defines a "qualified handicapped person" as one who is
eligible for the protection of the Act if she or he "meets the academic and technical
standards requisite to admission or participation in" the program or activity.
"1 574 F.2d at 1161.
11, Id. at 1162.
195 Id.
," 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979).
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to participate." 9 ' Rather, the Court held that the statute pro-
hibits disqualification of a handicapped person based on
"unfounded assumptions" of the limitations of the handicap.9 8
Justice Powell stated that an otherwise qualified person "is one
who is able to meet all of the program's requirements in spite
of his handicap." 199
Even though this language ostensibly paralleled HEW's
posture, Justice Powell further explained that the Court did
not think that § 504 imposes an affirmative duty on recipients
of federal funds to modify existing programs.210 Ms. Davis con-
tended that the HEW regulations imposed an obligation on the
college to make adjustments in the academic program which
would have permitted her to participate safely in the pro-
gram.01 The Court responded to this contention, suggesting
that the types of modifications proposed would constitute fun-
damental alterations in the program. Justice Powell wrote that
"an interpretation of the regulations that required the exten-
sive modifications necessary to include respondent in the nurs-
ing program would raise grave doubts about their validity. '20 2
He declared that such an interpretation would constitute an
"unauthorized extension of the obligations" imposed by the
Act.203
The Court added that it could find no legislative intent to
impose an affirmative action obligation on the recipients of
federal funds by way of § 504: "Section 504 imposes no require-
ment upon an educational institution to lower or to effect sub-
stantial modifications of standards to accommodate a handi-
capped person."2 4 The Court upheld the standards for admis-
sion which the college had established because they did not
reflect any animus against handicapped individuals but were
designed to select and train persons for the nursing profes-
"I Id. at 2366.
Is Id.
"I Id. See text accompanying notes 148-49 supra for HEW's interpretation of the
statute.
Iw 99 S. Ct. at 2369-70.
211 Id. at 2368.
1-z Id. at 2369.
2WId.
2I Id. at 2370.
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sion. °5 The mention of animus may indicate that the Court will
require under § 504, as it does in other discrimination stat-
utes,"'8 more evidence of intentional discrimination, rather
than the formerly established "effect" test.
CONCLUSION
The respective roles played by the judicial and administra-
tive branches in the implementation of the Rehabilitation Act
demonstrate the ambiguity of § 504 and Congress' failure to
clarify its desires. Not only has HEW been called upon to "fill
in the gaps" of the statutory definitions, but the judiciary has
been forced to wrestle with the procedural and substantive
issues which were created. The 1978 Amendments to the Act
do not satisfactorily resolve these problems.
The incorporation of Title VI remedies merely widens the
focus of the implication question to the legislative history of
Title VI, as well as § 504. The recent opinion of the Supreme
Court in Cannon, while discovering an implied right to sue for
violations of an analogous statute, does not conclusively re-
quire the same result under § 504.
In Cannon, the Supreme Court permitted the plaintiff to
proceed with her lawsuit even though she had not exhausted
the administrative remedies. The Court seemed to accept
HEW's "flexible approach," which would permit a court to
decide whether it wished to defer to HEW, thus enabling HEW
to choose those cases which it desired to review. 217 The theoreti-
cal basis of such a procedure has yet to be explained by HEW
or be developed by the courts.
The Rehabilitation Act is essentially a federal spending
statute, and the purpose of Title VI is to further a federal pol-
icy of nondiscrimination. For this reason the administrative
procedure should be the appropriate mechanism to resolve
disputes regarding the compliance of recipients. If, however,
20Id.
10 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of the issue in the context of Title
VII, see text accompanying note 159 supra.
217 See 44 Fed. Reg. 5204 (1979), Office for Civil Rights Operating Plan for Fiscal
Year 1979.
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the Act is to be treated as though it establishes individual
rights of action against recipients of federal funds, judicial
enforcement may be preferable. In addition to the speed with
which a lawsuit may be resolved, either through settlement
or by decision, a private right of action offers certain benefits
to both plaintiffs and defendants. The primary benefits are
the existence of well-defined rules of procedure and evidence,
neither of which apply in the administrative process where
the time limitation may be ignored, and the superior due pro-
cess protections available in the judicial process."' However,
under current HEW administrative rules, a complaint may be
initiated by a person in the administrative context without
standing to assert the claim in court."0 9
Even if an implied right to sue does exist under § 504, there
is an indication in Davis and other federal civil rights decisions
that the standard which the courts will apply to determine the
existence of discrimination will be whether or not there is a
discriminatory animus toward persons with a handicap. This
standard differs from the "effect" standard which is embedded
in the HEW regulations. 10 Thus, while the Supreme Court may
find a private right of action under § 504, the courts may re-
strict its protection by making proof on the merits more diffi-
cult.
Furthermore, Congress, by failing to define adequately the
broad class of handicapped persons and by excluding alcoholics
and drug abusers only in the context of employment decisions,
has created problems for many federally assisted programs
which do not receive funds specifically directed toward rehabil-
itation. Certainly it is reasonable to expect rehabilitation pro-
grams to serve the intended target population; it is not so rea-
sonable to fashion rehabilitation programs out of existing edu-
cational programs, such as professional schools.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Davis provides some help-
ful insight into the statutory language of § 504. Justice Powell's
- 45 C.F.R. § 80.8 (1977).
21 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(b) (1977) permits any person "who believes himself or any
specific class of individuals to be subject to discrimination prohibited by this part [to]
file with the responsible Department official . . . a written complaint."
210 See notes 159-67 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the standard.
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statement that a handicapped person must be evaluated for
admission to an academic program by the standard of whether
he or she could perform "in spite of" the handicap will aid
many federal fund recipients in carrying out their agreed re-
sponsibilities. This interpretation, along with the abandon-
ment of program changes which would substantially alter some
existing programs, may reverse temporarily the trend towards
full participation. Nevertheless, it will allow these persons the
same protections afforded those by Title VI and Title IX. For
example, in instances where minorities or women seek admis-
sion or benefits, the program is unaltered as a result of their
participation; only a different consumer group is present.
Most importantly, if Congress intends to permit a private
right of action, it can and should do so expressly. The implica-
tion of a private right to sue only opens the door to complex
litigation involving statutory and regulatory construction. A
model for such a statute is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,211 which prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, religion or national origin. The statute ex-
pressly requires the exhaustion of certain administrative proce-
dures prior to the initiation of a private cause of action.212
Finally, careful attention should be given to defining the
class of persons which Congress intends to protect by statute
and the scope of the protection it intends to grant them. Such
a revision or enactment cannot be casually undertaken. As the
enforcement history of the Rehabilitation Act demonstrates,
the time and expense which can be devoted exclusively to the
procedural aspects of § 504 can be considerable. The expecta-
tions of millions of handicapped persons have been raised by
the Rehabilitation Act with its careless and overbroad lan-
guage. Any attempts to draw more precise legislation may be
seen, not as attempts to aid the rights of handicapped persons,
but as efforts to restrict those rights. However, the current Act
and the regulations which are in apparent conflict with the
Supreme Court's standard for determination of discrimination
require the plaintiff in each instance to qualify as an
"otherwise qualified handicapped person" in order to establish
2,, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
212 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. 1973).
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standing under the Act.
If Congress were to draw legislation more precisely, these
preliminary issues would be removed, thereby assisting both
the class of intended beneficiaries, the institutions and agen-
cies which are subject to the terms of § 504, and the courts.
Guidelines would apprise each of these groups of the required
standard of conduct. In this manner, the merits of the action
could be reached more promptly, thus achieving what must
have been the intention of Congress: the end of unreasonable
discrimination against handicapped persons.
Nancy Ray
